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Sarantakes and Remmelink: The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, compiled by the War Histor

and Coast Guardsmen who served
in the Arabian Gulf during OIF, for
veterans of all times and services, and
for the American people so that they
could appreciate the sacrifices of the
young heroes who stood the watch to
protect their security. Furthermore, he
clearly states that his mission was to pen
a “leadership book with an emphasis
on lessons to help” future naval leaders
(p. 9). Vice Admiral Costello accomplished his mission, as did the naval
forces he was proud to lead into battle
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
SEAN P. HENSELER

The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, compiled
by the War History Office of the National Defense College of Japan, trans. Willem Remmelink. Leiden, Neth.: Leiden Univ. Press, 2016. 672
pages. $87.50.

Of the major military services of the
twentieth century, the Imperial Japanese
Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) are two of the least understood outside their national homes. As
a result, Willem Remmelink’s work in
translating into English the official Japanese history of the invasion of the Dutch
East Indies in 1942 is a major contribution to the study of World War II.
This book is volume 3 of 102 in the War
History series (Senshi Sōsho) that the
Japanese National Defense College—now
called the National Institute for Defense
Studies—produced between 1966
and 1980. It is the first of three that
Remmelink plans to translate on the
Dutch-Japanese war in 1942. The series
is joint in that it examines the activities
of both the IJA and IJN. With that
said, this volume focuses primarily, but
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not exclusively, on ground operations.
The other two planned translations
will focus on sea and air operations in
and around modern-day Indonesia.
Remmelink’s translation work is
impressive. This English-language
volume is full and unabridged. The book
includes seventy maps and probably
as many photos. The quality of the
maps is high, but that of the photos
leaves a little to be desired; they seem
to be scans of the photos printed in
the Japanese originals. Extras include
the Japanese order of battle, useful
glossaries of military and naval terms,
and indexes of personal and placenames in both English and Japanese.
The book starts off slowly, with the
early chapters containing a collection
of documents with a single sentence
connecting one staff memo to the
next; there is very little historical
analysis or narrative. But if one pulls
back a bit, these early chapters offer a
fascinating look at a military staff at
work planning real combat operations.
The Japanese enjoyed enormous and
rapid success in the seizure of the Dutch
East Indies. Why? The central argument
of history is that the Japanese isolated
the battlefield with air and naval assets.
The IJA and IJN worked well together
in joint operations. While the IJA had
material shortages even in 1942, it
overcame these problems with bold, innovative leadership. For example, the IJA
conducted its first airborne operation
during the invasion. The Japanese also
had the support of the local population,
which wanted to rid itself of the Dutch.
This history raises some interesting new
questions. Many of the strengths the
Japanese brought to the fight against
the Dutch were the exact opposite of
things they did in their war against the
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Americans. What happened? Why was
there such a fundamental change? Why
were the Japanese unable to sustain
these traits later in the war? Books
that challenge the received wisdom are
always fun, and this one only increases
the interest in the next two translations.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

India’s Wars: A Military History 1947–1971, by
Arjun Subramaniam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 576 pages. $40.

Air Vice-Marshal Arjun Subramaniam
is not a man to shy away from challenges. In India’s Wars, he attempts to
explain in one volume the creation,
evolution, and employment of India’s
armed forces during the first quarter
century of its independence. He
succeeds remarkably well, and this
volume likely will be the best example
of its genre for the foreseeable future.
India’s Wars is more than an impressive
chronological discussion of battles
fought and mostly won. Subramaniam
also examines questions and issues of
high strategy and national identity. For
example, he examines how a country
led by the heroically popular pacifist
Jawaharlal Nehru could create a joint
military consisting of former colonial
regiments with long and storied
traditions, elements of the Indian army
that had fought alongside Japanese
troops in World War II, and air and
naval forces. This section of the book
looks at India’s martial past during the
precolonial and colonial periods.
The book then follows a chronological
path, examining major military actions. Subramaniam looks hard at the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/12

first Indo-Pakistan War, of 1947–48.
Responsibility for initiating the war is
placed solely on Pakistan. Associated
chapters feature detailed descriptions
of India’s attempts to hold ground in
Jammu and Kashmir. Useful maps
accompany every battle description.
It is easy to forget, except in the wellknown example of Jammu and Kashmir,
that the boundaries of modern India
were not permanently established at partition. The princely state of Hyderabad
chose not to join greater India and opted
to continue as an independent state.
Similarly, Portugal did not relinquish
its city colony of Goa on India’s west
coast. When efforts at political solutions increasingly appeared doomed to
fail, the government decided to settle
both situations via military means.
The 1962 India-China war is examined
thoroughly with as much attention
to this Indian defeat as is given to
earlier victories. Subramaniam identifies
political failures on the basis of unrealistic expectations regarding Chinese
intentions and miscalculation of Chinese
capabilities. Mistakes in operational dispositions and tactics are faced squarely.
Subramaniam’s best writing covers
the 1965 war with Pakistan. He
carefully explains Pakistan’s strategic
and operational preparation for the
conflict, including an alliance with
the United States, modernization of
the Pakistani armed forces with U.S.
equipment, and substantial improvement of such capabilities as close air
support. Although Pakistan was unable
to field as many divisions as India,
Subramaniam makes a convincing
case that the acquisition of Patton
tanks, better artillery, and F-86 fighterbombers gave Pakistan a qualitative
edge. Subramaniam also makes a point
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